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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALLACE L. ROSANDER, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant~ 
vs. ~c~:7~ o. 
REX A. LARSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SAL'.r LAKE COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff's amended complaint asserted liability in 
the alternative on three causes of action: 
(a) On the first cause of action that plaintiff was 
a business invitee and sustained injuries as the result 
of defendant's negligence; 
(b) In the second cause of action that plaintiff 
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was a licensee other than business invitee and that his 
injuries were the proximate result of defendant's negli-
gence; 
(c) That the plaintiff was an employee of the 
defendant and that defendant failed to provide Work-
men's Compensation Insurance in plaintiff's behalf as 
required by Section 35-1-46, Utah Code Annotated, 
and that plaintiff was entitled to relief for his injuries 
sustained as such employee pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial judge required the plaintiff to elect 
between the three causes of action. When plaintiff 
elected to stand upon the third cause of action the 
judge entered an order dismissing the complaint on the 
ground that the plaintiff was not an employee of 
defendant as a matter of law. Judgment was entered 
dismissing the complaint without a hearing on the merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that upon 
appeal the judgment of the District Court be reversed 
and that the case be remanded for trial ·with instructions 
to proceed to trial on the a~nended complaint, and that 
no election of remedies be required until after satisfac-
tion of judg1nent on one of the three alternative clain1s 
for relief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff's original con1plaint asserted that he 
was a business invitee of the defendant. He came into 
a building being constructed by the defendant at Lot 
1-:l! SPRING HAVEN SUBDIVISION in Salt 
Lake County (R-1, para. 2 and 4). The plaintiff 
asserted that the defendant was negligent "in failing 
to cover a stairwell on the second story of the aforesaid 
building, failing to provide a safe passageway for the 
plaintiff, failing to notify plaintiff of dangerous and 
unsafe conditions on the aforesaid premises which were 
known to the defendant and his agents and employees, 
or in the exercise of reasonable care could have been 
ascertained by them, and failing to notify the plaintiff 
of unsafe and dangerous conditions upon said premises." 
Defendant's answer contains a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a cause of action, and denies any negli-
gence. As an affirmative defense, defendant alleged 
"That the plaintiff was an employee of defendant at 
the time and place of said accident and was in the course 
and scope of e1nployment at said time and that plaintiff's 
recourse is limited to benefits, if any, under the provi-
sions of the Workmen's Compensation Act." (R. 6, 
par. I.) Defendant also interposed the defense of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk (Ibid. 2-3) . 
In response to requests for admissions by the 
defendant, plaintiff asserted that he was engaged in 
working on the building at the time of the accident as 
a subcontractor (R. 7, para. I (e) ) . It also appears in 
the request for admissions and in the pre-trial conference 
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held before Judge Stewart M. Hanson on April 26 
that the plaintiff and his wife owned as joint tenants 
the land known as Lot 24 SPRING HAVEN SUB-
DIVISION, and that plaintiff had entered into a 
written contract with the defendant for the construction 
of a dwelling on that property. Plaintiff was somewhat 
experienced in the building business. He and the defen-
dant had an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff could 
employ a subcontractor in lieu of any subcontractor 
employed by the defendant, or plaintiff could do a 
certain part of the work and he would be credited with 
any savings effected by work which he performed him-
self or the difference between the price given to the 
defendant by plaintiff subcontractor and the subcon-
tractor which otherwise would have been used by the 
defendant (R. 7, 8, 13). At the time of the accident 
in question, plaintiff was attempting to climb one of the 
walls to assist in fastening the rafters. He reached for 
a rafter to support himself. "Thile having the appear-
ance of being fixed solidly in place, the rafter in question 
was not fastened and as a result, plaintiff fell through 
an open stairway and incurred the injuries of which 
he complained (R. 13). Plaintiff asserted that the 
defendant was negligent in failing to disclose the unsafe 
condition or hidden defect and in failing to have a cover-
ing over the stairway and allowing the same to remain 
open and in an unsafe condition (R. 14). At the original 
pre-trial conference the trial court framed the following 
Issues: 
"1. What was the relationship between plain-
tifl' and defendant? 
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2. If the relationship is and was that of a busi-
ness invitee then was the defendant negligent'? 
3. Was the plaintiff contributorily negligent? 
4. Did the plaintiff assume the risk? 
5. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what 
da1nages is he entitled to?" (R. 14-15). 
At the time of this pre-trial defendant also advised 
the court that he wished to assert his first defense to 
the effect that the complaint failed to state a claim for 
relief. The parties were given leave to file briefs on that 
1natter and the motion was taken under advisement. 
On May 29, 1961, Judge Hanson filed a memorandum 
decision entering a summary judgment for the defen-
dant and vacating the trial date (R. 18). The judge 
subsequently indicated that the motion for summary 
judgment was granted upon the ground that "it was 
the court's conclusion that at most plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant" and that in any event 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law (R. 24). Plaintiff moved the court for 
an order to vacate the order granting summary judg-
ment and granting leave to file an amended complaint. 
This motion was granted on June 20, 1961 (R. 25, 30). 
It does not appear from the record that any answer to 
the amended complaint was ever filed. However, the 
case came before Judge Ray VanCott, Jr. for pre-trial 
on March 19, 1962 on the amended complaint. On 
motion of the defendant, Judge Van Cott required 
the plaintiff to make an election as to which of the three 
causes of action he would stand upon. While objecting 
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to the motion, plaintiff elected to stand upon the third 
cause. At that point defendant's attorney moved to 
dismiss the third cause of action. The court granted the 
motion upon the grounds that the agreement between 
the parties whereby plaintiff would have the right to 
make savings in the building by finding subcontractors 
to work at a lower rate on particular parts of the project, 
or that plaintiff could perform parts of the work himself, 
created a situation whereby "there is no duty owed to 
this man by that defendant, and there is no showing 
of any negligence on the part of the defendant" ( R. 33) . 
It is important to observe that at no time was the 
plaintiff offered any opportunity to make a showing 
with respect to defendant's negligence or to file any 
affidavits or otherwise present any facts with respect 
to applicable customs or practices. Plaintiff was required 
to elect between three legal theories without having any 
opportunity to present the facts to the court or to have 
any determination as to the inferences which may be 
drawn from any of the relevant facts. The action of 
Judge Van Cott was on the pleadings and prior pre-
trial order. The record contains an affidavit of the plain-
tiff to the effect that plaintiff's "presence on said pre-
mises had no connection with the fact that he was the 
fee title owner of said prenuses, and his only object 
in going to said premises was to do work on the home 
pursuant to said contract ... and he took no action 
whatever to exercise control over said premises, which 
control had theretofore been relinquished to defendant 
Rex A. Larsen under a written contract dated August 
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18, 1959, in which said defendant began the general 
contract for the construction of a house on said premises 
and assumed control over said premises" ( R. 16) . 
ARGUJ.\f~~NT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ER.RED IN REQUIRING 
PLAINTIFF TO MAKE AN ELECTION AS 
AMONG THE THREE CAUSES OF 
ACTION IN I-IIS A.MENDED COMPLAINT. 
Pursuant to an order of the court dated July 10, 
1961 (R. 30) plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 
three alternative causes of action. The first cause of 
action alleged that plaintiff was a business invitee of 
the defendant and that the plaintiff's injuries were the . 
result of the defendant's negligence in "failing to cover 
a stairwell on the second story of the . . . building, 
failing to provide a safe passageway for the plaintiff, 
(and) failing to notify plaintiff of dangerous and unsafe 
conditions upon the said premises which were known 
to the defendant and his agents and employees, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care could have been ascertained 
by them, and failing to notify the plaintiff of unsafe 
and dangerous conditions." (R. 26.) The second cause 
of action was on the theory that plaintiff was on the 
premises with the permission and consent of the defen-
dant and that defendant was negligent in failing to 
notify the plaintiff of known defects. The third cause 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of action asserted that plaintiff was an employee of 
defendant and that the defendant failed to carry W ark-
men's Cmnpensation as required by Section 35-I-46 of 
the Utah Code and that liability was predicated upon 
the provisions of Section 35-I-57, U.C.A. I953. Over 
the plaintiff's objections, the court granted defendant's 
motion to require an election (R. 33). Requiring an 
election at this stage of the case constituted prejudicial 
error and was in direct violation of the provisions of 
Rules 8 (a) and 8 (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The pertinent provisions of Rule 8 are: 
" (a) Clairns for Relief. A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (I) a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and ( 2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief 
in the alternati•oe or of several different types may 
be demanded. 
* * * 
" (e) Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Con-
sistency. (I) Each averment of a pleading shall 
be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forrns 
of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim or defense alternately or hypo-
thetically, either in one count or· defense or in 
separate counts or defenses. TVhen two or rnore 
statements are rnade in the alternative and one 
of them if 1nade independently would be suffi-
cient~ the pleading is not rnade insufficient by the 
insufficiency of one or more of the alternative 
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state1nents. A party may also state as 1nany 
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless 
of consistency and whether based on legal or on 
equitable grounds or on both. All statements 
shall be made subject to the obligations set forth 
in Rule 11." 
The Utah cases have repeatedly held that the Utah 
rules were to be applied substantially in the same man-
ner and with the same affect as the substantially simliar 
Feder~l rules. Blackham v. Snelgrove (1955) 3 Ut. 
(2d) 157, 280 P. (2d) 453. Rule 8 (e) is applied by the 
Utah Code in Hjorth v. Wittenburg (1952) 121 Ut. 
324, 241 P. (2d) 907. 
The common law background of Rule 8 and par-
ticularly 8 (e) is discussed at 2 Moore"' s Federal Prac-
tice_, Second Edition, paragraph 8.31, pg. 1702, 1703. 
At page 1704 Professor 1.\'Iore says: "A pleading may 
present alternative statements of the facts or alterna-
tive legal theories." Many examples are given at pages 
1704 and 1705. A later collection of the cases in point 
appears in the 1961 cumulative supplement for these 
same sections. 
Professor Moore points out that to require an elec-
tion of causes of action would defeat the very purposes 
which the rule was designed to correct. At Section 8.32 
( pg. 1707 ibid) Professor Moore states : 
"An alternative or hypothetical pleading by 
its very nature is inconsistent. This, however, is 
not a valid objection to it under Rule 8 (e) and 
for good measure the rule goes on to provide that 
a party may state separate claims for defenses 
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regardless of the consistency and whether based 
upon legal or equitable grounds or both. "\Vhether 
or not a party pleads one claim alternatively or 
hypothetically in a single count or pleads the 
claim formally as separate claims in two or 1nore 
counts is largely one of jurisdiction ... the con-
sistency may lie either in the statement of the 
facts or in the legal theories adopted, and the 
party will not be required to elect upon which 
theory he will proceed since this would defeat 
the usual purpose of allowing inconsistent plearl-
ing." 
Many cases under the federal rules have explicitly 
held that no election is required of inconsistent causes 
of action. A complete review of all of the cases decided 
under Rule 8 (e) would unduly lengthen this brief. 
Reference is made here to only a few illustrative cases. 
In Senter v. B. F. Goodrich Co. (U.S. D. C. Colo. 
1955) 127 F.S. 705, plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
was liable on the theory of negligence in one cause of 
action and in a second cause of action asserted liability 
for breach of warranty on the sale of tires. The court 
refused to require an election and entertain evidence 
relevant to both issues. In its opinion the court said: 
"A defendant cannot compel a plaintiff to 
choose at his peril the theory upon ·which he 
intends to rely and thereby possibly defeat a 
recovery where two consistent, concurrent or 
cumulative theories can be urged with prejudice 
to the defendant's ability to defend. If an action-
able wrong has taken· place recovery is to be 
granted regardless of th~1ry and relief must not 
be denied through the vehicle of a forced elec-
tion." 
10 
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In notes 4 and 5 on the same page the court said: 
"'Vhere remedies are not inconsistent, but are 
alternative and concurrent, there is no bar until 
one of them has been prosecuted to judgment, 
unless plaintiff has gained an advantage or defen-
dant has suffered a disadvantage. State v. Comp-
ton, Tex. Civ. App. 174, S.W. 2d 977, affirmed 
1944, 142 Tex. 494, 179 S.W. 2d, 501. Also, cf. 
Tallent v. ~.,ox, 1940, 24 Tenn. App. 96, 141 
S.W. 2d 485, where court held that plaintiff in 
suing for breach of warranty in original warrant, 
based on delivery of diseased hogs which had been 
represented to be sound, had not elected his 
remedy so as to prohibit amending warrant by 
adding counts for breach of contract, and fraud 
and deceit, since counts added by amendment 
were not repugnant or antagonistic. See also 
De Hart v. Allen, 1942, 49 Ca. App. 2d, 639, 
122 P. 2d 273, wherein the courf held that the 
doctrine of election of remedies rests on the prin-
ciple of estoppel, and there can be no estoppel 
unless the two remedies are inconsistent and 
repugnant, and unless unfair or unjust detriment 
would result from the exercise of both. 
"Even apart from the liberal spirit in1bued in 
the federal rules the doctrine of election of reme-
dies should be applied only to actions taken by 
same litigant which are necessarily inconsistent, 
and such doctrine being a severe one should gen-
erally, not be extended. Petillo v. Stein, 1945, 
184 Md. 644, 42 A. 2d 67 5." 
In Bernstein v. United States (CCA 10, 1958) 
256 F (2d) 697 at 706, Judge Murrah, speaking for a 
unanimous court, held: 
"'·vhatever may be said for the common law 
11 
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doctrine of election of remedies before the advent 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we are 
certain there is no room for its application under 
applicable rules of procedure, according to which 
every pleading is a simple, concise state1nent 
of the operative facts on which relief can be 
granted on any sustainable legal theory 'regard-
less of consistency, and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both'; Rule 8 (e) 
(I) (2) F.R. Civ. P., and where the prayer or 
demand for relief is no part of the claim and the 
dilnensions of the lawsuit are measured by what 
is proven. Western Machinery Co. v. Consoli-
dated Uranium l\1ines 10 Cir., 247 F. 2d 685; 
Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 2 Cir., 
148 F. 2d 974. When the complaint is judged in 
the context of the philosophy of these ·modern 
procedural concepts, we are convinced that the 
election of remedies is inapplicable here." 
The Fourth Circuit applied the same rule in Mont-
go,mery Ward v. Free1nan (CCA 4, 1952) 199 F. 
(2d) 720. 
Rule 8 has particular application in the case at 
bar. At the first pre-trial conference held on April 26, 
1961, Judge Stewart J\f. Hanson outlined the issues 
as follows: 
"I. V\That was the relationship between plain-
tiff and defendant? 
"2. If the relationship js and was that of a 
business invitee then was the defendant negli-
gent? 
"3. 'Vas the plaintiff contributorily negligent? 
"4. Did the plaintiff assun1e the risk? 
12 
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"5. If the plaintiff is entitled to recover, what 
damage is he entitled to?" 
The court observed that the defendant had filed 
a 1notion to dismiss the complaint and the court took the 
motion under advisement (R. 15). Judge Hanson sub-
sequently granted the motion to dismiss on the original 
complaint concluding that "at most the plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant." It is to be observed that 
Judge Hanson set aside his order dismissing the com-
plaint expressly for the purpose o_f permitting the 
plaintiff to file an amended complaint in alternative 
causes of action (ibid). We have in this case the anomaly 
of the first district judge who heard the case ruling 
that the plantiff was an employee of defendant without 
hearing the evidence, and then a second district judge 
ruling that as a matter of law and without hearing the 
evidence plaintiff was not an employee. It is submitted 
that this is precisely the kind of a situation which Rule 
8 (e) was supposed to remedy. Plaintiff has been denied 
a hearing on the merits, not because either of th~ three 
causes of action was insufficient in itself, but hecause 
Judge Van Cott took it upon himself to rule first that 
plaintiff had to elect at his peril as to whether he was 
(a) a business invitee, or (b) simply a permissive occu-
pant of the premises, or (c) whether he was an employee. 
After having required an election, the judge then ruled 
as a matter of law that plaintiff could not be an employee 
thereby denying him an opportunity whatever to present 
relevant facts to the court. It is submitted that Judge 
VanCott's ruling in the case at bar is in direct opposition 
13 
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to the purpose and intent of Rule 8 (a) and 8 (e) and is 
fiat contradiction of the leading authorities on the appli-
cation of these rules. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE DEFENDANT O'VED TO THE 
PLAINTIFF NO DUTY. 
The plaintiff was on the premises in question in 
one of three possible legal relationships to the defen-
dant: 
(a) He was a business invitee; or 
(b) He was a licensee, or 
(c) He was an en1ployee of defendant. 
The liability predicated upon each of these various 
causes of action was pleaded in the three alternative 
causes of action. In Wimmer v. Bamberger R.R. Co. 
et al. (1947) Ill Ut. 444, 182 P. (2d) 119, this court 
adopted the definitions and distinctions of the Restate-
1nent on Torts between the liability of possessor of prop-
erty to gratuitous licensees and business invitees. A 
licensee is defined as "a person who is privileged to enter 
or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor's consent, 
whether given by invitation or permission. A gratuitous 
licensee is defined as "any licensee other than a business 
visitor as defined in Section 332." Gratuitous licensees 
are persons "whose presence upon the the land is solely 
for the licensees own purposes in which the possessor 
14 
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has no interest, either business or social, and to whom 
the privilege of entering is extended as a mere favor by 
express consent or by general or local custom." Restate-
1nent on Torts_, Sections 330-331. A business visitor is 
"a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain 
on land in the possession of another for a purpose 
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings 
between the1n" (Ibid Section 332). In commenting upon 
Yarious classes of business visitors, the editors of the 
Restatement state in Comment (a) to Section 332: 
"Thus, a delivery rnan of a provisions store, 
while delivering goods to a residence is a business 
visitor of the possessor thereof, so to is a work-
Inan who comes to make alterations or repairs 
on the land used for such purposes." 
Comments (f) and (g) to Section 332 of the Restate-
ment are as follows: 
"f. Members of possessor's household. A Inem-
ber of the possessor's family, although ordinarily 
a bare licensee (see Sec. 331, Comm~nt a), is a 
business visitor if he pays board or gives other 
valuable consideration for his residence upon the 
possessor's land. 
"g. Servants. A servant, whether an industrial 
employee or a domestic servant, is a business 
Yisitor. If he is an industrial employee, the pur-
pose of his entry is directly connected with the 
business which the possessor conducts upon the 
land. If he is a domestic servant, he enters the 
land for a business purpose of his own which 
concerns the affairs of the possessor, in that it is 
incidental to the possessors residential and social 
use of the land. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The relation of master and servant has certain 
peculiarities which have given to the servant a 
smnewhat different degree of protection than 
that which is given to other classes of business 
visitors. . . . " 
The distinction between the liability of possessors 
of land to gratuitous licensees and business visitors is 
discussed in Comment (a) to Section 343 of the Re-
statement: 
"There is only one particular in which one who 
holds his land open for the reception of business 
visitors is under a greater duty in respect to its 
physical condition than a possessor who holds his 
land open to the visits of a gratuitous licensee. 
The possessor has no financial interest in the 
entry of a gratuitous licensee; and, therefore, 
such a licensee is entitled to expect nothing more 
than an honest disclosure of the dangers which 
are known to the possessor. On the other hand, 
the visit of a business visitor is or may be finan-
cially beneficial to the possessor. Such a Yisitor 
is entitled to expect that the possessor will take 
reasonable care to discover the actual condition 
of the premises and either make them safe or 
warn hin1 of dangerous conditions. As stated in 
Section 342, a possessor owes to a bare licensee 
only the duty to exercise reasonable care to dis-
close to hin1 dangerous defects which are kno"\\'11 
to him and are likely to be undiscovered by the 
licensee. Toward the business visitor, the posses-
sor owes the additional duty to exercise reason-
able care to make the land safe for the reception 
of his visitor, or, at the least, to ascertain the 
actual condition of the land so that by warning 
the visitor thereon, he may give the visitor an 
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opportunity to decide intelligently whether or 
not to accept the invitation or permission. 
In Wimmer v. Bamberger Co. et al.~ supra, this 
court applied the Restatement distinction to hold that: 
"A workman who goes upon the land to make alterations 
or repairs is a business visitor." The court in that case 
held that a carpenter employed by an independent con-
tractor to insulate walls and ceilings of a railroad shop 
was a business visitor and the railroad owed to him a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to make the property 
safe or to ascertain the actual condition of the property 
and to warn the visitor. 
If the plaintiff in the case at bar was only a gratu-
itous licensee, then the defendant owed a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to disclose to him the dangerous condi-
tion_ of the rafter which was known to defendant and 
likely to be undiscovered by the plaintiff. Such was the 
theory of plaintiff's second cause of action. If the plain-
tiff was a business visitor, then he had an affirmative 
duty to discover the actual condition of the premises 
and either make them safe or warn the plaintiff of these 
dangerous conditions. 
The holding of the trial court that the defendant 
"had no duty to the plaintiff" is palpably and obviously 
erroneous. 
The substance of the third cause of action was that 
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant but that 
defendant had failed and neglected to carry Workmen's 
Compensation Insurance or otherwise satisfy the provi-
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sions of Section 35-1-46, U.C.A. 1953 with respect to 
plaintiff. The Third cause of action was filed under 
35-1-57, U.C.A. 1953 which provides in pertinent part 
as follows: 
"Employers who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of Section 35-1-46 ... shall be liable 
in a civil action to their employees for damages 
suffered by reason of personal mjuries arising 
out of or in the course of employment caused 
by the wrongful act, negligence or default of the 
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents 
or employees ... In any such action the defen-
dant shall not avail himself of any of the follow-
ing defenses: The defense of the fellow-servant 
ruling, the defense of assumption of risk, or the 
defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the 
injury shall constitute prima facie evidence of 
the negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show 
freedom from negligence resulting in such in-
. " 
.Jury ... 
It does not appear from the record that the defendant 
ever answered plaintiff's amended complaint. However, 
in answer to the plaintiff's original complaint the defen-
dant alleged as an affinnative defense "that plaintiff 
was an employee of the defendant at the time and place 
of said accident and was in the course and scope of his 
employment at said time and that plaintiff's recourse 
is limited to benefits, if any, under the provisions of the 
'Vorkn1en's Compensation Act" (R. 6). Thus the 
relationship of employer-employee is admitted by the 
defendant. The application of Section 35-1-57 is patent. 
Our statute provides that proof of the injury constitutes 
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evidence of negligence on the part of the employer. The 
burden is upon the employer to show freedom from 
negligence and there appears to be no other defense. 
\ V e do not reach the question as to whether the "prima 
facia evidence of negligence" provided by the statute is 
procedural or substantive or is a "rebuttable presump-
tion of law'' as was considered by the court in Buhler 
Z'. Maddison (1949) 105 Ut. 39, 140 P. (2d) 933, sub-
sequent opinions at 109 Ut. 245, 166 P. (2d) 205; 
opinion on rehearing 109 Ut. 267, 176 P. (2d) 118. 
Defendant offered no evidence to rebutt the presump-
tion. The court ignored the defendant's own claim that 
the plaintiff was an employee and entirely by-passed 
the statute to enter judgment against the plaintiff with-
out any opportunity whatever for a hearing on the 
merits. 
The rulings of the district judge in the case at bar 
clearly and obviously deny plaintiff his day in court 
on the 1nerits of his alternative pleading. Each of the 
three causes of action viewed separately states a valid 
claim for relief against the defendant. The arbitrary 
dismissal of the complaint without any opportunity 
whatever to present evidence in support of any of the 
legal theories pleaded is a shocking abuse of judicial 
power. 
POINT III. 
THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
A CO-OWNER OF THE PREMISES DOES 
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NOT BAR RECOVER1:'" FOR DEFENDANT'S 
NEGLIGENCE. 
The record in this case is that plaintiff and his wife 
were owners of the land upon which a dwelling was 
being constructed "and that the defendant was in pos-
sessionof the dwelling as such as general contractor ... '' 
( R. 7) . As one of the owners of the land plaintiff 
entered into an agreement with defendant as general 
contractor for the construction of the premises. The 
defendant had made estimates as to costs of various 
items involved in the construction. One of the provisions 
of the agreement was in the event the plaintiff was able 
to effect savings as to these various items by obtaining 
another subcontractor at a lower amount than defen-
dant's estimates or by plaintiff doing part of the work 
himself, the amount of such savings was to be credited 
to the plaintiff (R. 7, 8). This arrangement was noted 
in the pre-trial order of .Judge Hanson dated April 26, 
1961 (R. 13). The purpose of the plaintiff's visit to the 
pre1nises on the date of the injury had nothing to do 
with the fact that plaintiff was the owner of the premises 
and the uncontradicted record in the case is that plaintiff 
"took no action whatsoever to exercise control over such 
premises, which control had theretofore been relin-
quished to defendant Rex A. Larsen under a written 
contract dated August 18, 1958 in which said defendant 
beca1ne the general contractor for the construction of 
a house on said premises and assumed control over said 
pre1nises." The plaintiff's business on the premises at 
the time and place of the accident was either as a business 
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invitee or a gratuitous licensee or an employee of the 
defendant. Certainly the plaintiff was not a trespasser. 
On any of the three theories pleaded in the plaintiff's 
amended complaint, plaintiff was entitled as a minimurnJ 
to present evidence on the question of negligence. 
Even if it be conceded, however, for the purpose 
of argument, that the plaintiff's interests as owner can-
not be separated from any other business relationships 
to the defendant, the fact that he is owner does not 
absolve the defendant from any duty to exercise reason-
able care toward the plaintiff in the same manner and 
to the same degree that the defendant owes the same 
duty to any other person. The Restatement of the law 
of torts explicitly states that the liability to a business 
invitee arises because of the possession of the property. 
"A possessor of land is subject to a liability ... " accord-
ing to Section 343 of the Restatement (emphasis sup-
plied). And the comments to the Restatement clearly 
establish that the reason for the rule is that the possessor 
has within his control relevant conditions of safety upon 
the property. Who has a more legitimate interest in 
visiting premises where construction is under way by a 
general contractor than the owner of the premises ? 
Suppose Mr. A as owner enters into a contract with 
Mr. B for the construction of a dwelling, the contract 
specifying the quality of material, size of rooms and 
various and sundry other matters concerning the com· 
pletion of the unit. The contractor obviously has com-
plete control over the condition of the premises during 
the time of construction but the owner certainly would 
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be entitled to enter upon the premises at reasonable 
times to determine whether the contract was being 
completed in accordance with the applicable specifica-
tions. Suppose the contractor negligently leaves a thin 
piece of sheeting across an area· in the floor where the 
owner might be expected to pass upon his inspection 
tour, and upon such a visit the owner steps upon the 
sheeting, breaking it with his feet and is injured in the 
resulting fall. Would anyone contend that the owner 
was not a business invitee within the rule and allow 
recovery against the contractor? Such was Negra v. L. 
Lion and Sons Co. (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) 227 P (2d) 
916 where it was expressly held that negligence of the 
contractor or his employees gives rise to a cause of 
action for personal injury to the owner of the premises. 
The reason for the contractor's liability is that he has 
supervision and control over the entire building during 
its construction and where he negligently creates a con-
dition he is primarily responsible for the consequences 
which follow. Pastorelli v. Associated Employer, Inc. 
(D.C.R.I. 1959) 176 F.Supp. 158; Smith v. Wilson 
(1958) 325 P (2d) 421. Section 387 of the Restate1nent 
on Torts explicitly states: 
"An independent contractor or servant to 
whom the owner or possessor of land turns over 
the entire charge thereof is subject to the same 
liability for harm caused to others within or out-
side the land by his failure to exercise reasonable 
care to n1aintain the land in safe repair as though 
he were the possessor of the land." 
The fact that the plaintiff had the right to go on 
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the pren1ises and perform certain work upon the build-
ing does not mean that the contractor in charge of the 
premises owes no duty of reasonable care to him. It is 
well settled that a subcontractor is a business invitee 
of the contractor. In Dingman v. A. F. Mattock Co. 
(Sup. Ct. Cal., 1940) 15 Cal (2d) 622, 104 P (2d) 26, 
the subcontractor was injured when scantling which 
had been placed across an open stairwell broke as the 
subcontractor attempted to assent from one level to 
another. It was held that the subcontractor was a busi-
ness invitee of the general contractor where he was 
required to enter the very part of the building where the 
accident occurred. 
J(UPTZ v. Ralph Sollitt ~Sons Construction Co. 
(CCA 5, 1937) 88 F (2d) 532, cert. den. 302 U.S. 696, 
82 L.Ed. 537, 58 S. Ct. 14 holds that an electrical sub-
contractor's fore1nan was an invitee and the general 
building contractor owed a duty to keep the premises 
in safe condition. Mecham v. Gor·don 307 Mass. 59, 28 
N.E. (2d) 759 holds that an employee of the owner of 
the premises may recover on the business invitee theory 
against a general contractor installing a vault and door. 
In Glenn v. Gibbons x Reed Company (1954) 
1 Ut. (2d) 308, 265 P (2d) 1013, this court held 
that the bailor of a large shovel was in the position of a 
business invitee UJ20n property in the control of a con-
tractor. The court said: 
"We need not delve into the difficult questions 
involved in an implied invitation, for here New-
man received an express invitation to go upon the 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
land of the defendant by virtue of his contract 
with the defendant to shovel gravel for their 
mutual business advantage. Therefore N ewn1an 
was a business invitee upon the property and the 
company owed him the duty of conducting its 
known dangerous activities with reasonable care 
for his safety. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 346. 
This, of course, is equally applicable to the 
equipment which he brought ~pon the land in 
furtherance of his contract with the defendant.'~ 
In Donahoo v. l(ress House Moving Corporatio-n 
(1944) 147 P (2d) 637; subsequent opinion (1944) 
153 P ( 2d) 349, 25 Cal. ( 2d) 237, the plaintiffs were 
occupants of the premises in question as tenants. A 
house moving contractor permitted them to live in the 
house and to remain on the premises during the removal 
of the house to the rear of the lot. The court held that 
the defendant owed to the plaintiffs a duty as invitees 
and was required to provide reasonably safe passageway 
for ingress and egress to and from the house and guard 
openings or evacuation made by the defendants as con-
tractors on the premises. The theory of the case was 
that the plaintiffs were agents of the owners and as such 
the defendants owed a duty to them as business invitees. 
The authorities clearly establish the proposition 
that a contractor owes a duty of care to the owner of the 
pre1nises on the same theory upon which the duty arises 
in other instances where the business invitee doctrine is 
applicable. No case has been found where a court ruled 
that the owner of premises ·which were in the possession 
of a general contractor was deprived of his cause of 
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action against the contractor simply because he was 
owner. It is certainly possible that in a given instance 
a person who owned a particular piece of property 
upon which construction work was in progress could 
be an employee of the contractor. In that event there 
is no reason why the ordinary legal relations between 
employers and employees would not be applicable be-
tween the persons involved insofar as employment 
relationships were concerned. In the c.ase at bar, insofar 
as the district court's ruling denied plaintiff's recovery 
because of his co-ownership in the property, it was 
grossly erroneous. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The amended complaint stated three alternative 
legal theories upon which liability could be predicated. 
Each one of these theories was sufficient in and of itself 
upon which to base a judgment against the defendant. 
The court erred in requiri~g the plaintiff to elect one 
of the theories to the exclusion of the others prior to 
a hearing on the merits. The court erred further in 
determining that no judgment could be predicated on 
the third cause of action. The judgment of the district 
court should be reversed with instructions to proceed 
to trial and submit the case to the jury upon all three 
causes of action. If the jury should return a verdict 
for the plaintiff upon all three causes of action, then, 
of course, satisfaction of the judgment on one of the 
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causes would act as a bar to enforcement on the other 
two. Until the facts are determined, however, there is 
no occasion to require the plaintiff to make an election. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
.Attorney for Plaintiff-.Appellant 
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